Criminal Contempt—Power of Federal Courts to Punish Summarily—Geographical Limitation—Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States Overruled by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 26 Issue 4 
January 1941 
Criminal Contempt—Power of Federal Courts to Punish 
Summarily—Geographical Limitation—Toledo Newspaper Co. v. 
United States Overruled 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Criminal Contempt—Power of Federal Courts to Punish Summarily—Geographical Limitation—Toledo 
Newspaper Co. v. United States Overruled, 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 566 (1941). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss4/20 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
566 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
dealt with. The court thus manifests a desire to limit the possibility of
judicial encroachment on the rights of freedom of speech and of the press.
It reflects a salutary reaction from the recent tendency toward undue
expansion of the contempt power.= The present case brings Missouri law
approximately into line with that of a majority of the states and of the
federal courts. 3
Despite the liberalizing effect of this decision, the reasoning of the court
may be criticized as disingenuous. The court avails itself of researches in
legal history to confine to pending cases the summary power over contempt
by publication, but ignores the point that the central fact developed by these
same researches is that the courts had no power at common law to punish
any indirect contempt, whether relating to a past or to a pending case,
except after a jury trial.14 The Missouri court, refuting defendants' claim
of a right to jury trial, properly states that the guarantee in the Missouri
Constitution of 1820 refers to that right as it existed at common law prior
to 1820, and then says further that contempts have always been punished
summarily at common law. This is true as to direct contempts, those com-
mitted in the presence of the court, but the whole point of the authorities
-which the court itself cites is that it was never true of indirect contempts
until the courts usurped such power in the seventeenth century.0
Again, in reasserting the inherent and necessary power of judicial
tribunals to safeguard the administration of justice from interference, the
court fails to recognize that contempt by publication, or other conduct out-
side the presence of the court which interferes with a pending case, has
traditionally been dealt with through criminal process.1O Here the court
assumes that any scandalous publication referring to a pending case will
be obstructive, denying that there is any valid distinction between con-
tempts committed in the presence of the court and indirect contempts by
publication. This fails to discriminate between conduct which is obstructive
and comment which may be merely defamatory. Contempt means something
more than adverse criticism or disrespect. Published matter is not often
obstructive in any real sense, even of pending litigation.
R. K.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-POWER OF FEDERAL COURTs TO PUNISH SUMMARILY
-GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATION-TOLEDO NEWSPAPER Co. V. UNITED STATES
OVERRULED--[United States] .- Defendant was convicted of criminal con-
tempt in a federal district court for attempting to bribe the plaintiff in g
wrongful death action to dismiss it. The attempt took place more than 100
miles from the courthouse. Held: reversed. Section 268 of the Judicial
12. See supra note 5.
13. 17 C. J. S., Contempt (1939) 41, sec. 30; Note (1935) 24 Cal. L. Rev.
114; Nye v. U. S. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 810.
14. See Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 6, at 1042; see also Fox,
op. cit. supra note 6, at pp. 116-117.
15. Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 6, at 1045.
16. See Nye v. U. S., supra note 13. See Comment (1941) 26 WASHING-
TON U. LAW QUARTERLY 566.
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Code,' which provides that the summary contempt power of the federal
courts does not extend beyond misbehavior in the presence of the court, or
"so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice," imposes a
geographical limitation on the contempt power. Nye v. United States.2
This case adds a new and confusing chapter to the history of the con-
tempt power of the federal courts since 1831. Prior to that time there was
little statutory restriction of the power to punish summarily for contempts
of court.3 Abuses arose, especially in regard to punishment of contempts
consisting of publications which criticized the conduct and decisions of
judges. The impeachment, trial, and acquittal of Judge Peck in 1831,
following his summary punishment of a lawyer who criticized a decision by
Peck,4 was succeeded immediately by the act of Congress in question here,
which was intended to prevent further abuses by limiting and defining the
power of contempt.5 The act was in two sections. The first limited the
power of the court to punish contempt summarily to misbehavior in the
presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct justice, to misbe-
havior of officers of the court in official transactions, and to disobedience of
court orders.6 The second section provided for indictment and criminal
trial for attempting to obstruct justice or to influence jurors, witnesses, or
officers of the court.7
The first decision following the act, Ex parte Poulsons laid down a very
strict interpretation of section 1, allowing summary punishments by the
court for only "that kind of misbehavior which is calculated to disturb the
order of the court, such as noise, tumultuous or disorderly behavior * * *."
A clear line was drawn between physical misbehavior and the subversive
activities described in the second part of the act, and summary punishment
was restricted to the former.
1. (1831) 4 Stat. 487, c. XCIX, sec. 1, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 385.
2. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 810.
3. (1789) 1 Stat. 83, c. XX, sec. 17, gave the courts power "to punish by
fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of
authority in any cause or hearing before the same."
4. For a full account of the trial, see Stansbury, Trial of James H. Peck(1833). A shorter account of the circumstances and of the trial is to be
found in Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States
(1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 401, 423-431.
5. See Frankfurter and Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts (1924)
37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010; Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the
United States (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 401; Note (1941) 27 Va. L. Rev. 665.
6. (1831) 4 Stat. 487, c. XCIX, sec. 1, 28 U. S. C. A. 385. The part of
the statute pertinent to the present case reads as follows: "The said courts
shall have power * * * to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion
of the court, contempts of their authority. Such power to punish contempts
shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any
person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administra-
tion of justice, * * *."
7. (1831) 4 Stat. 488, c. 99, 18 U. S. C. A. 241. This is now sec. 135 of
the Criminal Code.
8. (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1855) Fed Cas. No. 11,350. The case dealt with the
power of the court to punish a newspaper summarily for a libel of plaintiff
in a pending ease.
9. (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1835) Fed. Cas. No. 11,350, at 1208.
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Later cases weakened this distinction and relaxed the requirement of
physical proximity.' 0 In Ex parte Savin" the Supreme Court held that an
attempt to bribe a witness was misbehavior punishable under the summary
contempt powers of the court. The contemptuous acts took place in the
corridor and witness room of the courthouse, which were held to be "in the
presence of the court." The Court therefore found it unnecessary to decide
the effect of the "so near thereto" clause.12 Eventually a new line of cases
arose which again broadened the power of federal judges to punish sum-
marily for contempt.' 3 Ex parte McLeod14 interpreted the statute to mean
that the criterion by which the misconduct must be brought within the
statute was not physical nearness, but causal connection, based upon the
likelihood of the misbehavior to: obstruct justice. This interpretation was
adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Toledo Newspaper Co.,
involving a contempt by publication, so that the statute was denied any
restrictive effect at all.' 5
The instant case specifically overrules the Toledo case,16 as historically
inaccurate.'Y The rule laid down, however, is not absolutely clear.' s There
are two possible views of the Court's interpretation of the statute. One
would restrict the right to punish summarily for contempt to that sort of
physical misbehavior which disturbs the order of the court. 19 This would
seem to be a reversion to the interpretation in Ex parte Poulson. The other
10. See U. S. v. Holmes (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1842) Fed. Cas. No. 15,383.
-Cf. Ex parte Robinson (1874) 19 U. S. 505, 511, "the power of these courts
in the punishments of contempts can only be exercised to insure order and
decorum in their presence, * * *." See also U. S. v. Anonymous (C. C. W. D.
Tenn. 1884) 21 Fed. 761, which, however, hinted at the more liberal rule.
See also Nelles and King, supra note 4, at 530.
11. (1889) 131 U. S. 267.
12. In Ex parte Cuddy (1889) 131 U. S. 280, which involved an attempt
to bribe a juror, the court likewise refused to decide the effect of distance.
13. See Note (1941) 27 Va. L. Rev. 665, 668.
14. (1903) 120 Fed. 130.
15. (1918) 247 U. S. 402. Holmes and Brandeis dissented, on the ground
that no real obstruction was shown. The prevailing view up to the present
case has been the same as the McLeod and Toledo cases. Cooke v. U. S.
(1925) 267 U. S. 517; Sinclair v. U. S. (1929) 279 U. S. 749; McCann v.
N. Y. Stock Exch. (1935) 80 F. (2d) 211. But see Col v. U. S. (1925) 8
F. (2d) 20; Berry v. Midtown Service (1939) 104 F. (2d) 107. For a
summary of the trends of decisions to the present case, see Thomas, Prob-
lems of Contempt of Court (1934) c. VII.
16. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 810, 817.
17. There is considerable authority for the Court's view. See, e. g.,
Frankfurter and Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts (1924) 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 1010, 1029 et seq. Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (1927) 6.
18. Query the precise meaning of: "The fact that in purpose and effect
there was an obstruction in the administration of justice did not bring the
condemned conduct within the vicinity of the court in any normal meaning
of the term. It was not misbehavior in the vicinity of the court disrupting
to quiet and order or actually interrupting the court in the conduct of its
business." (1941) 61 S. Ct. 810, 817.
19. This rule seems to have been deplored by some contemporary writers.
See, e. g., 1 Kent, Commentaries (3rd. ed. 1836) 300. Kent thought that
the statute deprived courts of protection against libels of the press.
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would allow summary punishment of any contempt, so long as it took place
in geographical proximity to the court. The dissent regards this latter view
as the holding of the majority.2 If that is the correct interpretation, the
difficult problem remains of what is a sufficiently short distance to come
within the meaning of the statute.21 The geographical criterion, moreover,
seems unrealistic; there is little difference in practical effect between bribery
in the corridors of the courthouse and bribery miles away which affects the
same case. Any other criterion, however, seems out of accord with the
statutory language.
J. D. H.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-1917 ADOPTION STATUTE-INHERITANCE FROM
KINDRED OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS-EQUITABLE ADOPTIONS-[Missouri].-Plain-
tiff sought to be decreed the adopted son of Bert L. McIntyre and as such
the great grandson and heir of Tabitha T. Cunningham, in an action
brought against her legatees. A deed of adoption had been made out
whereby the Children's Home Board on March 17, 1917 relinquished plaintiff
to the McIntyres, who, by the deed, agreed to adopt and said they did
adopt plaintiff as their child and heir. The deed was not recorded, as was
necessary to make it effective under the statute,' because there was then
pending in the Missouri General Assembly a proposed adoption law2 (which
became effective June 18, 1917) that would enlarge the privileges of an
adopted child, and the adopting parents were advised to confer these rights
on the child. It was contended that plaintiff was entitled to inherit under
the 1917 statute3 either because of an agreement to adopt under that
statute or because the 1917 law applied to prior as well as subsequent
adoptions no matter when the status was created. The trial court held that
the agreement to adopt made plaintiff an adopted child under the old law
on March 17, when the deed was signed and the child taken from the
Children's Home. 4 It further held that the act of 1917 applied only prospec-
tively.- The plaintiff appealed from the latter holding. Held: affirmed.
McIntyre v. Hardesty.6
20. Mr. Justice Stone says: "I do not understand my brethren to main-
tain that the secret bribery or intimidation of a witness in the court room
may not be summarily punished." (1941) 61 S. Ct. 810, 819.
21. See, e. g., Ex parte Savin (1889) 131 U. S. 267 (attempt to bribe a
witness in corridor and witness room of the court house). Sinclair v. U. S.(1929) 279 U. S. 749 (juror shadowed near courtroom).
1. R. S. Mo. (1909) sees. 1671 & 1673.
2. The act of 1917 was part of Chapter 125, Article 1, R. S. Mo. (1929)
sees. 14073-14081, and is now the present adoption law of Missouri, R. S.
Mo. (1939) sees. 9608-9614.
3. R. S. Mo. (1939) sees. 9608-9614.
4. In a previous action plaintiff had obtained a decree of a circuit court
declaring he was the adopted child of Bert L. McIntyre by and after July
:30, 1917.
5. R. S. Mo. (1939) sees. 9608-9614, particularly 9614. The first sentences
of section 9614: "When a child is adopted in accordance with the provisions
of this article, all legal relationship, and all rights and duties, between such
1941]
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